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PRESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM MANDATORY
RETIREMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
HAROLD H. BRUFF*
The Civil Service Retirement Act subjects federal employees to
mandatory retirement, ordinarily at age seventy, and grants the Presi-
dent broad discretionary power to exempt employees from mandatory
retirement by executive order.2 The Act applies to great numbers
of lower level employees, and to members of the independent regula-
tory commissions as well. Yet independent commissioners, unlike
most federal employees, are appointed by the President under statutes
which specify a term of service and make no reference to retirement.
3
Consequently, the appointment of a commissioner nearing retirement
age raises questions concerning which statute should govern his tenure.
* B.A. 1965, Williams College; J.D. 1968, Harvard University. Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Arizona State University. This Article is based upon a report prepared for
the Administrative Conference of the United States. It has been submitted to the Com-
mittee on Agency Organization and Personnel with an appropriate recommendation, but
as of the publication date, neither the report nor the recommendation had been ap-
proved by the Committee or the Conference.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
W. CARY, PoLrncs AND THE REGULATORY AGEN cEs (1967) [hereinafter cited as
CARY];
H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINITsRATIvE AGENCIES, THE NEED FOR BErrnR
DEFINm ON OF STANDARDS (1962) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY];
Dixon, The Independent Comlissions and Political Responsibility, 27 AD. L. REv.
1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331 et seq. (1970).
2. Id. § 8335:
Mandatory separation
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, an employee who be-
comes 70 years of age and completes 15 years of service shall be automatically
separated from the service.
(c) The President, by Executive order, may exempt an employee from
automatic separation under this section when in his judgment the public in-
terest so requires.
(d) The automatic separation provisions of this section do not apply to--
(1) an individual named by a statute providing for the continuance
of the individual in the service;
(2) a Member;
(3) a Congressional employee; or
(4) an employee in the judicial branch appointed to hold office for a
definite term of years.
3. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970) (FTC); 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) (ICC).
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Although the current practice is to subject independent commis-
sioners to mandatory retirement despite their statutory terms, and thus
to permit the President to decide whether to grant an exemption,4 its
legality-and its wisdom-are open to question. The practice may un-
duly invade a fundamental statutory policy favoring commission inde-
pendence by giving the President excessive control over the tenure of
aged commissioners. Consider the potential for presidential influence
over a commissioner hoping for an exemption, or possessing an exemp-
tion of indefinite duration which is presumably subject to revocation
at the will of the President. In this regard, it is important to distinguish
retirement exemptions from reappointment, since no one would chal-
lenge the existence of absolute presidential discretion in the reappoint-
ment decision. The approach of a reappointment decision certainly
carries potential for White House influence, but that cannot be avoided
as long as reappointments are permitted. And if a commissioner is
reappointed, it is for a substantial period.
Furthermore, regardless of the merits of the exemption power, it
is arguable that independent commissioners should not -be subject to
mandatory retirement at all. For example, one goal of long terms for
independent commissioners is to promote the development of exper-
tise; the separation requirement takes effect as the experience of a par-
ticular commissioner reaches its maximum.5
This Article examines the appropriateness of applying the manda-
tory Tetirement and presidential exemption provisions6 to members of
the independent regulatory agencies.7 Although there has never been
a definitive judicial resolution of the question whether statutes setting
4. See text accompanying notes 8-23 infra.
5. Of course, arguments based on accumulated expertise can be made against
mandatory retirement for anyone. For some special considerations relevant to the com-
missioners, see text accompanying notes 92-95 infra.
6. For all employees except presidential appointees, the exemption authority has
been delegated to the Civil Service Commission. Exec. Order No. 10,530, 3 C.F.R. 189
(1954-58 comp.); Exec. Order No. 10,682, 3 C.F.R. 331 (1954-58 comp.). See text ac-
companying notes 24-42 infra.
7. Analysis focuses on members of the major independent regulatory commissions
(ICC, FTC, FPC, SEC, CAB, FCC, NLRB), the Civil Service Commission, and the
Tax Court. The Civil Service Commission is included because of its own role in retire-
ment and exemption functions. The Tax Court is included because its members received
a number of early retirement exemptions, see Table 1 in the Appendix, and because it
provides an interesting institutional comparison to the regulatory commissions. See text
accompanying note 17 infra. The Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 352, § 1106, 67 Stat. 482,
created a separate retirement system for Tax Court judges, and explicitly ended the ap-
plicability to them of the mandatory separation provisions of the Civil Service Retire-
ment Act. See S. REP. No. 675, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The statute has been
codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7447 (1970).
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the terms of independent commissioners should be read as implied ex-
ceptions to the Retirement Act, the legislative history of the Act and
Supreme Court decisions in the analogous area of presidential removal
of independent commissioners suggest the appropriateness of such a
reading. The discussion begins with a survey of the past use of the
exemption power in order to illustrate the characteristics of the practice
and the potential for abuse that flows from it.
I. EXERCISE OF THE EXEMPTION POWER
A. Presidential Appointees
The President's power under the Retirement Act to exempt fed-
eral employees from mandatory retirement dates from 1932.8 Al-
though the exemption authority for most employees has been delegated
to the Civil Service Commission, the President still controls exemptions
for all presidential appointees."
Members of the independent commissions became subject to the
Retirement Act in 1946.10 An examination of the executive orders
issued since that date reveals several distinct characteristics of the ex-
emption practice.1 First, the total number of exemptions is rather
low. Nearly thirty years have seen only twenty-nine exemptions for
members of the major commissions and Tax Court judges, and twenty-
five for other employees.
In addition, presidential usage of the exemption power has varied
substantially. Most of the exemptions of independent commissioners
8. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 204, 47 Stat. 404. See note 51 infra.
9. See note 6 supra.
10. See text accompanying notes 50-59 infra.
11. Tables 1 and 2, found in the Appendix of this Article, summarize the executive
orders issued since members bf the independent commissions became subject to the Re-
tirement Act in 1946. Table 1 collects exemptions of members of the major regulatory
commissions, the Civil Service Commission, and the Tax Court. See note 7 supra.
Table 2 gives the titles of all other employees exempted by Executive Order from 1946
to date.
The contents of the Executive Orders have varied little over the years. The orders
issued immediately following the extension of the Retirement Act in 1946 recite that
the Act is just becoming applicable to the officers involved. Exec. Order No. 9780, 11
Fed. Reg. 10,645 (1946); Exec. Order No. 9895, 12 Fed. Reg. 6493 (1947). The orders
routinely invoke their underlying statutory authority, and simply parallel the statute, 5
U.S.C. § 8335(c) (1970), by reciting that "in my judgment, the public interest requires"
that the person be exempted. The sole exception to the otherwise uniform practice of
declining to elaborate individualized reasons for an exemption occurred in the case of
Pregident Truman's personal secretary. President Nixon included some fulsome rhetoric
on her indispensability, presumably for scrapbook purposes. See Exec. Order No.
11,619, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1971 tomp.).
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and Tax Court judges occurred in a short burst of activity under Presi-
dent Truman, in the years following the extension of the Retirement
Act to these employees. These exemptions can be explained, at least
in part, as responses to a need to avoid excessive turnover in the agen-
cies as the statute first took effect. President Eisenhower issued only
one executive order regarding an exemption, and that was to convert
President Truman's indefinite extension for the Organist and Choir-
master at the Military Academy into one expiring within three
months. 12 President Eisenhower is said to have firmly held the view
that no retirement exemptions should be granted; 3 the presence of
his single executive order terminating one bears this out. There has
been no other executive order by any President shortening or revoking
an exemption. 14  The next President to demonstrate a practice of ex-
empting independent commissioners was President Nixon, who
granted five exemptions, three of them to FTC Commissioner A.
Everette Maclntyre. President Ford has exempted two commissioners.
The presence of seven exemptions granted by -two Presidents in the
last five years constitutes a re-emergence of the practice which warrants
consideration of its institutional implications.
One major change in the practice seems to have occurred over
time. Most of President Truman's exemptions were for an indefinite
period, not to extend beyond the recipient's current term of office.
Some of these orders even contemplated the possibility of an entire
new term for the commissioner, yet did not commit the President to
an extension for the duration. 15 Presidents Nixon and Ford, on the
other hand, have set time limits on their exemptions, -although this has
not prevented repeat exemptions as in the cases of FTC Commis-
sioner MacIntyre (three) and CAB Commissioner Whitney Gillilland
(two). The change is thus from indefinite extensions to relatively
short-term ones, most of them for about a year, and with an apparent
possibility of renewal. Either practice, however, makes the affected
commissioner seem subject to White House bidding, an untoward effect
which could be reduced simply by instituting a tradition that all exemp-
12. Exec. Order No. 10,569, 3 C.F.R. 209 (1954-58 comp.).
13. Interview with Rosel IL Hyde, former Commissioner, FCC, in Washington,
D.C., July 24, 1975. See note 22 infra and accompanying text for one minor exception
to this policy.
14. Although no individual's exemption has been revoked, an order granting mass
exemptions was later terminated. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
15. Compare Exec. Order No. 9963, 13 Fed. Reg. 2943 (1948), and Exec. Order
No. 10,034, 3 C.F.R. 227 (1949-53 comp.) (granting indefinite extensions not to exceed
new term), with Exec. Order No. 10,255, 3 C.F.R. 760 (1949-53 comp.) (exempting
FPC Commissioner Claude L. Draper for full new term).
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tions be for the remainder of the commissioner's term, or for a definite
period not subject to extension. 6
The early exemptions under President Truman demonstrate other
troubling institutional characteristics. First, his use of the exemption
for judges of the Tax Court seems particularly inappropriate, since
their primary responsibility is to adjudicate, and unlike the independent
commissioners, they do not have other major policy-making responsibili-
ties which might justify exempting a "key" individual. Although Tax
Court judges now have a separate retirement system not subject to the
exemption power, 17 the precedent remains a troubling one for those
agencies with substantial adjudicative duties. Second, the presence on
an agency of several exempted members at one time increases the pos-
sibility for White House influence. Thus, for a time in 1949, three
of four FTC commissioners' 8 and five of sixteen Tax Court judges
were under exemption.'
Finally, one use of the exemption power suggests a possible
means of avoiding the institutional difficulties of individualized de-
terminations. This is the blanket exemption. In two separate in-
stances involving special circumstances, Presidents have issued broad
16. The latter suggestion would allow for retention of a commissioner to fill a need
for his expertise on a particular matter. For example, ICC Commissioner Kenneth H.
Tuggle was exempted from retirement to help complete the Northeast railroad reorgan-
ization. See Washington Post, July 20, 1975, at G4, col. 1. A useful comparison to
this suggested procedure is provided by the practice of the Civil Service Commission in
restricting the duration and renewal of the exemptions it controls. S~e text accompany-
ing notes 24-31 infra. Ample security of tenure should result under either scheme sug-
gested in the text since it is unlikely that the President could revoke an exemption for
a set period without establishing the necessary grounds for the commissioner's removal.
See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935). Limitations on the removal power are discussed in detail in the
text accompanying notes 67-88 infra. See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959);
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
Even an indefinite exemption may provide some practical security. During the early
part of the Eisenhower administration, both ICC Commissioner J. Monroe Johnson and
FCC Commissioner Paul Walker were on indefinite extensions granted by President
Truman. Assistant to the President Sherman Adams raised the question of revoking
both exemptions, presumably to replace the men with persons more congenial to the new
administration. Interview with Frederick W. Ford, former Chairman, FCC, in Wash-
ington, D.C., July 24, 1975. The idea was dropped, however, apparently at least in part
because of doubts whether even an indefinite extension could be revoked without cause.
Id. Again, the analogy would be to the removal cases. The only executive order to
date which terminates an exemption is the one issued by President Eisenhower shorten-
ing the indefinite extension for the Organist and Choirmaster at the United States Mili-
tary Academy. Exec. Order No. 10,569, 3 C.F.R. 209 (1954-58 comp.).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. Compare 45 F.T.C. H (1950) with Table 1 in the Appendix.
19. Compare 13 T.C. I1 (1950) with Table 1 in the Appendix.
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executive orders exempting groups to whom the statute applied. The
first, by President Roosevelt, exempted all presidential appointees for
an indefinite period not extending beyond their current term of serv-
ice, in order to avoid losing the services of a great many officers to
whom the Retirement Act was just becoming applicable. 20 The second
blanket exemption extended the terms of presidential appointees
reaching the retirement age for a period of some months to allow the
statutory amendments of 195621 to govern their retirements.22  Thus,
perhaps the President could issue an order exempting all members of
the independent commissions from retirement for the duration of their
then current terms.23
B. Federal Employees Other Than Presidential Appointees
For all employees except presidential appointees, the Civil Serv-
ice Commission controls exemptions from mandatory retirement.24
Pursuant to its delegated authority, the Commission has promulgated
a comprehensive rule controlling the exercise of the exemption
power.25 The rule contains a special provision restricting the use
of the power in the case of administrative law judges,26 which is ap-
parently designed to protect the judges' independence from their em-
ploying agencies. Comparison of the Commission's controlled proce-
dures for exemption with the President's uncontrolled exemption
power is illuminating. Analogy to the President's power in this regard
is provided by a statutory provision granting agencies broad discretion
to reemploy retired persons instead of seeking retirement exemptions
for them.2 7
The Commission's exemption regulations state that an agency de-
siring to exempt an employee shall submit a recommendation to that
20. Exec. Order No. 9047, 3 C.F.R. 1084 (193843 comp.), revoked, Exec. Order
No. 10,512, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1954-58 comp.).
21. Act of July 31, 1956, ch. 804, § 401, 70 Stat. 743.
22. Exec. Order No. 10,674, 3 C.F.R. 327 (1954-58 comp.).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 8335(c) (1970). This section, however, is now phrased in the
singular ("may exempt an employee"), suggesting that individualized determinations
must be made. As recently as the 1956 amendments, the statute referred to exemption
of "any" employee, perhaps a plural term. Act of July 31, 1956, ch. 804, § 401, 70
Stat. 748. The change in phraseology occurred in the 1966 codification of title 5, and
appears to have been without intentionhl substantive significance. Act of Sept. 6, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8335, 80 Stat. 571; see H.R. 'R.hP. No. 901, 89th Cong.,. 1st Sess.
3, 160 (1965).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. 5 C.F.R. § 831.503 (1975).
26. Id. § 831.503(b)(2).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 3323(b) (1970). See also FEDERAL PEasoNNE. MANUA.L 300-17,
subeh. 7 (1969); FEvmL PERSONNEL MANU. StUPP. 831-1, subch. S15 (1973).
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effect to the Commission.28 For employees other than administrative
law judges, the recommendation filed by the agency head is to contain
a statement that the employee is willing to remain in service, a recital
of facts showing that retention would be in the public interest, the pe-
riod for which exemption is desired (which may not exceed one year),
and the reasons why the simpler method of retiring the employee and
immediately reemploying him is not being used.29 Recommendations
are to be accompanied by a medical certificate showing the physical
fitness of the person to continue. 0 The Commission will approve an
exemption only prior to the automatic separation date applicable to the
employee.8" As the regulation suggests, this power is not invoked of-
ten; the agencies simply reemploy annuitants instead.
For administrative law judges, 2 the recital of facts showing that
retention is in the public interest is to include a showing that the judge
is responsible for a previously assigned case or cases that are unfin-
ished because of circumstances that could not have been foreseen at
the time of assignment. The period of exemption is not to exceed the
lesser of a year or sufficient time to complete the pending cases, and
the Commission will grant each judge only a single exemption.83  Since
these more stringent limits seem designed to protect the judges' inde-
pendence from their employing agencies, the Commission's policy is
relevant in examining the exemption of independent commissioners
from mandatory retirement, at least insofar as the latter exercise adjudi-
cative functions, and in a broader sense to the full extent that the com-
missioners are meant to be independent of White House influence.
The most important controls in the Civil Service regulation are the
time limits, the rule against repeat exemptions, and the requirement
for a specific showing of unusual circumstances that justify the exemp-
tion. These kinds of controls could provide an appropriate check on
presidential discretion in exemption decisions. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that substantial limits upon the discretion of the President or an
agency will result from requirements for general recitals of the need
to retain an employee, or for medical certificates of fitness to serve.
28. 5 C.F.R. § 831.503 (1975).
29. Id. § 831.503(b)(1).
30. Id. § 831.503(3).
31. This provision responds to 37 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 393 (1936), stating that the Pres-
ident had no authority to issue a proposed executive order exempting a customs em-
ployee, since the effective date of retirement had passed.
32. 5 C.F.R. § 831.503(b)(2) (1975). The regulation uses the superseded term
"hearing examiner" for these officers, who are appointed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(1970). See 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972).
33. 5 C.F.R. § 831.503(b)(2) (1975).
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The more frequently employed practice of reemployment is gov-
erned by the provision stating that "an annuitant. is not barred by
reason of his retired status from employment in -an appointive position
for which he is qualified. An annuitant so reemployed serves at the
will of the appointing authority." 4  The employing agency, not the
Civil Service Commission, makes the decision to reemploy an annui-
tant" and then notifies the Commission of its action. 36  The Federal
Personnel Manual provides that no special appointing authority is
needed for reemployment because it is done under general grants of
authority. 7  According to the Manual, the provision of section 3323
(b) stating that an annuitant serves at the will of the appointing author-
ity means just that: "a reemployed annuitant may be separated at any
time at the discretion of the appointing officer, regardless of type of
appointment."' 8
In only one case has an exercise of the reemployment power been
challenged. In Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. FTC,8 the hearing examiner
in an FTC proceeding reached the date of mandatory separation after
submission of the case to him, but before he had made his findings,
conclusions, and recommended decision. The FTC reemployed him
for two intervals amounting to forty-five days, but then allowed his em-
ployment to expire, whereupon another hearing examiner made find-
ings and conclusions on the existing record. This was attacked as arbi-
trary and as a violation of due process. On review of the order the
FTC issued in the case, the Eighth Circuit thought that the Commis-
sion's decision not to continue the hearing examiner's employment was
within its complete discretion and not subject to judicial review. 40  The
court was not persuaded by the Administrative Procedure Act's provi-
sion that the officer who receives evidence shall make the recom-
mended decision unless he becomes unavailable to the agency,41 and
would not read the APA to condition the Retirement Act by imposing
34. 5 U.S.C. § 3323(b) (1970).
35. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL 300-17, subch. 7 (1969); FEERrAL PERSONNEL
MaAN.L SUpP. 831-1, subch. S15 (1973).
36. Id. subch. S15-2 (1973), S15-7 (1974). The Commission will not approve
reemployment of administrative law judges in order to protect the judges' independence
from their employing agencies. See Minute 1 of the Minutes of the Civil Service Com-
mission for December 23, 1968.
37. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL 300-17, subch. 7-3a (1969).
38. id. subch. 7-3b.
39. 211 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1954).
40. The court was interpreting an earlier version of the reemployment statute which
did not allow reemployment "unless the appointing authority determines that he is pos-
sessed of special qualifications." Id. at 111.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
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any duty on the agency to reemploy a retired employee,42 or to seek
his exemption. Unfortunately, the opinion in Gamble-Skogmo is not
an aid to analysis. The court's wooden approach is typified by its re-
fusal to attempt an accommodation of the policies of the two statutes
through recognition of a limited duty on the part of an agency either
to retain its hearing examiner during the disposition of a case, or to
explain why it will not do so.
The facts of Gamble-Skogmo suggest a potential problem in
the retirement of independent commissioners. If a commissioner
reaches the mandatory separation age during agency consideration of
an important case, the President's decision whether to grant an exemp-
tion will not seem divorced from its impact on the case. Appearances
will not be aided by the practice of offering no reasons for the grant
or denial of an exemption, and it seems most unlikely that a court
would attempt to impose any requirements for presidential explanation.
The solution is to remove the occasion for such an unseemly exercise
of discretion by a statutory amendment resolving the issue of the com-
missioner's tenure in advance.
IL. APPLICATION OF THE RETIREMENT ACT PROVISIONS
TO INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONERS
Only once has the legality of applying the Presidents exemption
power to independent commissioners been challenged in an adjudica-
tory proceeding.4 3 Consumer groups attempting to intervene in an
FTC proceeding challenged Commissioner MacIntyre, then under ex-
emption from retirement, arguing that the exemption statute should not
be read to apply to independent commissioners because of its funda-
mental inconsistency with the intended independence of the commis-
sions." The consumers also invoked the due process cases on interest
of an adjudicatory officer,45 arguing that Commissioner MacIntyre re-
42. 211 F.2d at 112. The court held, however, that when credibility determinations
are important, the decision should be made by the officer who conducted the hearing;
it remanded the case for further proceedings.
43. 1T Continental Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1188 (1973).
44. See Renewed Motion of Consumers Federation of America, Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc., and Federation of Homemakers, Inc., to Intervene as Parties;
and Motion Requesting Disqualification of Commissionei Macntyre from Participation
in this Proceeding, lIT Continental Baking Co. (F.T.C., filed Mar. 29, 1973);
Memorandum to the Commission in Support of Renewed Motion, ITT Continental Bak-
ing Co. (F.T.C., filed Mar. 29, 1973).
45. See generally Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). This constitu-
tional argument proves too much, since the federal executive branch is replete with ad-
judications finally decided by officers without secure tenure. Rejection of a constitu-
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garded himself as serving essentially at the pleasure of the President,
a presumed status that infected his decisions with considerations of per-
sonal gain or loss. The consumers further argued that even if section
8335 applied to commissioners, it should not be read to authorize short-
term, renewable exemptions, which maximize a President's possible in-
fluence over a commissioner. Instead, the officers' statutory terms and
the Retirement Act should be read together to minimize policy conflict
by requiring that exemption, if granted, be for the remainder of a term.
Commissioner MacIntyre refused to disqualify himself.4 0 He de-
nied any undue influence from the White House, and appended a 1969
memorandum for the White House staff regarding contacts with the in-
dependent agencies, 47 which observed that the commissioners had
"quasi-judicial responsibilities" for individual cases, and that, obviously,
interference in this function would be highly improper. The con-
sumer groups responded that Commissioner Maclntyre's answer failed
to address the primary issue raised by their motion.48 They had not
suggested the existence of specific attempts to influence the Commis-
sioner, but had simply argued that one cannot assume that an officer,
no matter how great his personal integrity, can remain unaffected by
the fact that his continued service is within the discretion of the Presi-
dent. It was, the consumers urged, to prevent this actual or apparent
prejudice that Congress made the commissions independent. The
Commission responded with an unexplained order denying the motion
for disqualification."
Thus, in the only case involving a challenge to the legality of the
exemption power as it applies to independent commissioners, the tri-
bunal involved failed to address the central issue, the potential for un-
due presidential influence over a member of an independent agency.
As the following analysis will show, the conclusion that it is inappropri-
ate to apply the mandatory retirement and exemption provisions of the
Retirement Act to members of independent commissions is not pre-
tional argument based on the interest cases, of course, does not prejudice arguments
based on statutory policy that the situation in which Commissioner MacIntyre found
himself should be avoided.
46. 1IT Continental Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1188 (1973).
47. Id. at 1191.
48. Comments on Commissioner Maclntyre's Response to Amici's Motion for Dis-
qualification, lT Continental Baking Co. (F.T.C., filed Apr. 9, 1973).
49. ITT Continental Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1188, 1194-95 (1973). Commissioner
Mary Gardiner Jones filed a separate statement. She thought it a serious issue whether
Commissioner Maclntyre's status was governed by the Retirement Act or his statutory
term, and bemoaned the status of a Commissioner serving after age seventy under
circumstances of legal uncertainty. Id. at 1192-94.
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cluded by the legislative history of the Act and is supported by case
law in the analogous area of presidential removal of independent com-
missioners.
A. Legislative History and Analysis
The original Civil Service Retirement Act, passed in 1920, did not
apply to presidential appointees.50 The President's power to exempt
covered employees from mandatory retirement dates from 1932.51 The
first extension of the Retirement Act to include members of the inde-
pendent commissions occurred in 1942 when, by the Act of January
24, 1942,; Congress expanded the application of the Act in an all-
inclusive fashion: "This Act shall apply to all officers and employees
in or under the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the
United States Government, all elective and appointive officers in or un-
der the said branches . . . ." A major purpose in so extending the
Act was to provide retirement benefits for the members of Congress
themselves.53 A storm of public protest ensued, blasting the Congress
for lining its own pockets in times of national peril. With unusual ala-
crity, Congress responded with the Act of March 7, 1942,r 4 which
added "except elective officers and heads of executive departments"
to the above language in the January statute. It is clear that by this
language Congress meant to exclude members of the independent
commissions from the Retirement Act;-, its reasons for doing so, how-
50. Act of May 22, 1920, ch. 195, § 1, 41 Stat. 614. The Act applied only to em-
ployees in the classified civil service, which did not include presidential appointees. See
34 Op. ATr'y GEN. 334, 337 (1924). The Act also contained a specific exception for
presidential appointees in certain named agencies whose employees were otherwise spe-
cifically included within the Act's coverage, such as the Library of Congress. See Act
of May 22, 1920, ch. 195, § 1, 41 Stat. 614. This explicit exception was later dropped
from the statute without legislative explanation, see Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 801, § 3,
44 Stat. 904, but for the probable reason that it was superfluous.
51. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 204, 47 Stat. 404. The original language of
the exemption was substantially similar to its present form: 'The President may, by Ex-
ecutive Order, exempt from the provisions of this section any person when, in his judg-
ment, the public interest so requires .... " See note 2 supra (text of current statute).
The first exercise of the power was immediate. See Exec. Order No. 5872, 2 PROCLAMA-
TzONS AND ExctrrrT ORnnus: HmmERT HoovER 1218-20 (G.P.O. 1974) (dated June
30, 1932).
52. Ch. 16, § 3, 56 Stat. 15. President Roosevelt soon issued Exec. Order No. 9047,
3 C.F.R. 1084 (1938-43 comp.), exempting for an indefinite period not to exceed their
current term of office "[all officers and employees in the Executive branch" appointed
by the President.
53. See 88 CONG. Rnc. 456-63, 515-17, 1578-79 (1942).
54. Ch. 166, § 16(c), 56 Stat. 147.
55. Ch. 166, § l(d), 56 Stat. 143. The statute defines "department" as "any ex-
ecutive department, independent establishment, or agency (including corporations) in
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ever, are more obscure. Most of the legislative history of the March
amendment is directed to the political advisability of excluding Con-
gressmen from the retirement system,56 and an excess of caution may
account for exclusion of the Cabinet and agency heads as well. 5
In 1946, Congress again reversed itself and explicitly extended
the Retirement Act to commissioners of the independent agencies. The
statute was short and simple;58 its stated purpose was simply "to include
the heads of executive departments and independent agencies within
the purview of the Civil Service Retirement Act. .... ,,59
the executive branch ...." At the time of the bill's passage, the House and Senate
conferees pointed out this language and named several of the major independent agencies
as examples of those included within the definition. 88 CONG. REc. 1727-29, 1824
(1942).
56. See Hearings on S. 2242, S. 2247, and S. 2284 Be/ore the Comm. on Civil Serv-
ice, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); Hearings on H.R. 6471 Before the Comm. on Civil
Service, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); 88 CONG. REc. 947, 1386-90, 1440-42, 1462-69,
1576-85,.1725-30, 1822-24 (1942).
57. The debates indicate some concern for the need to remove as many "high-sala-
ried executives," 88 CONG. REc. 1576 (1942), and "political appointees," id. at 1577,
as possible. The amendment was tacked onto unrelated legislation to speed passage.
There is an indication that the conferees went as far toward outright repeal of the Jan-
uary statute as parliamentary rules would allow. Id. at 1729, 1824.
58. Act of July 24, 1946, ch. 612, 60 Stat. 659:
AN ACT
To include the heads of executive departments and independent agencies
within the purview of the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930.
Be it enacted... [t]hat section 3(a) of the Civil Service Retirement
Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, is amended by striking out the words "and
heads of executive departments".
See. 2. ... As used in this section the term "department" means any
department, independent establishment, or agency (including corporations) in
the executive branch of the Government.
59. Id. The present form of section 8335 of the Retirement Act, the mandatory
retirement provision, derives from the Act of July 31, 1956, ch. 804, § 401, 70 Stat.
748. The 1956 statute applied generally to any "employee," a term defined as "a
civilian officer or employee in or under the Government. . . ." Ch. 804, § 401, 70 Stat.
743. Upon the codification of title 5 in 1966, a generic definition of the term "em-
ployee" was attempted in section 2105(a). See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
554, § 2105, 80 Stat. 409. The Act provides:
Employee
(a) For the purpose of this title, "employee", except as otherwise pro-
vided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an
individual who is-
(1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in
an official capacity-
(A) the President;
(B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;
(C) a member of a uniformed service;
(D) an individual who is an employee under this section;
or
(E) the head of a Government controlled corporation;
(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under au-
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The legislative history of the bill is rather scant. The House Re-
port60 simply stated the purpose of the statute in the terms of its head-
ing, and incorporated a letter from Civil Service Commission President
Harry B. Mitchell for elaboration. In the letter, Mitchell said the pro-
posed statute would deal with only about ninety of two million federal
employees, and that even some of these were already covered because
the appointees had previously been in qualifying positions. Mitchell
remarked that the Tax Court had the largest number of employees not
currently "protected" by a retirement system and that "[t]here seems
no reason why they should be discriminated against." ICC and FCC
commissioners would also be affected. Since some employees in these
positions already had retirement rights, he concluded, the bill sought
"to correct the inequality."(1
Discussion of the bill in the House largely paralleled the thrust
of the letter.62 Representative Jennings Randolph, Chairman of the
House Committee on the Civil Service, said the bill had the unanimous
thority of law or an Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph
(1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties
of his position.
The statute is substantially the same today, see 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (1970), and the Re-
tirement Act has since referred to this provision for its principal delineation of coverage,
with some modifications not relevant here. See 5 U.S.C. § 8331(1) (1970).
The committee reports accompanying the original codification explain that the pur-
pose of section 2105(a) is "to avoid the necessity of defining 'employee' each time it
appears in this title. The subsection is based on a definition worked out independently
by the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and in use by both for
more than a decade." H.R. RaP. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1965); S. REP.
No. 1380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966). A literal reading of the language of section
2105(a) would suggest that perhaps the definition of employee means to exclude mem-
bers of the independent commissions, on grounds that they are not subject to the super-
vision of anyone while engaged in their duties. The question whether independent com-
missioners are properly regarded as subject to "supervision" by the President is a subtle
one. See text accompanying notes 114-33 infra. Of course, the commissioners are sub-
ject to the President's supervision in at least the limited sense that he has the power
to remove them for cause. See text accompanying notes 67-88 infra. In any event, it
seems most unlikely that section 2105 was meant to have the effect of removing mem-
bers of the independent agencies from the coverage of title 5. Any such reading would
violate the stated purpose of the codification of title 5, which was to restate the existing
law without substantive change. H.R. RP. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1965).
It would also have multiple collateral consequences such as denying the commissioners
retirement benefits. Furthermore, the inclusion of the detailed definition of employee
is best understood as directed to the essentially unrelated problem of deciding when state
employees engaged in federally funded programs should be regarded as federal employ-
ees. Stapleton v. Macy, 304 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
60. H.R. REP. No. 2429, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
61. Id. at 2.
62. See 92 CONG. REc. 8254 (1946).
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support of his panel, and recited the substance of the Mitchell letter.
"This is remedial legislation," he said, remarking on the applicability
of the statute to members of the Tax Court, the ICC, and the FCC.63
Again the concern was with removing perceived discrimination against
a few officials. After this momentary consideration, the House
pa~sed the statute.
In the Senate, the legislative history is even more sparse. The
committee document simply indicated that the statute would apply to
about ninety positions, some of them already held by employees cov-
ered by the Retirement Act, and gave the cost of the bill. 64 On the
floor of the Senate, Senator Sheridan Downey briefly remarked that
these were the only federal employees denied retirement benefits, and
that the bill would merely grant them rights held by other federal
workers. 65
Congressional attention in passing the statute thus seems to have
focused exclusively upon the benefits to agency heads from extending
coverage to them. There is no recorded consideration of whether the
mandatory separation requirement should apply to the independent
agencies, and no consideration of the implications of the presidential
exemption power. The first application of that exemption power to
independent commissioners occurred immediately thereafter, how-
ever. 6
B. The Presidential Removal Power: Application of the Case Law
to Exemptions from Retirement
The President's power to grant or deny retirement exemptions is
functionally similar to his power to remove commissioners from office.
Accordingly, the policy reasons offered in the cases limiting the re-
moval power, which emphasize a congressional desire to maintain
agency independence, are applicable in the retirement context as well.
The removal cases thus illustrate the reasons why members of inde-
pendent commissions should not be held subject to the mandatory re-
tirement provision while the President retains the discretionary power
to exempt them from retirement.
The first test of the President's removal power occurred in 1926
in Myers v. United States.67 Frank Myers, a postmaster, was appointed
63. Id.
64. S. REP. No. 1679, 79th Cong., 2d Se s. (1946).
65. 92 CONG. Rrc. 9203 (1946) (remarks of Senator Downey).
66. Exec. Order No. 9780, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,645 (1946).
67. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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by the President and confirmed by the Senate under a statute which
gave him a four-year term, unless he were sooner removed with the
Senate's advice and consent. President Wilson dismissed Myers without
asking for the Senate's approval. In a suit for Myers's salary, the Su-
preme Court held that the provision of the statute restricting the Presi-
dent's power of removal was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Taft's ma-
jority opinion relied on the provisions of article 11 of the Constitution
that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President," and that
"he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 8 The
Chief Justice reasoned that the executive power is exclusively vested
in the President, and that accordingly the agents of the executive must
be exclusively responsible to him. In dictum, however, he did ac-
knowledge a possible need to modify so simplistic a view of the separa-
tion of powers:
Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically com-
mitted to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question
whether the President may overrule or revise 'the officer's interpretation
of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there may be duties
of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and mem-
bers of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests
of individuals, the discharge of which -the President can not in a particu-
lar case properly influence or control. But even in such a case he may
consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for removing the
officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that
officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or -wisely
exercised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own constitutional duty
of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.69
Justices Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis dissented."
This endorsement of very broad presidential discretion to remove
officers was severely limited in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 1' a case involving President Roosevelt's attempt to remove FTC
Chairman William Humphrey, a Hoover nominee. Roosevelt prodded
Humphrey to resign, advancing only grounds of policy differences.
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
69. 272 U.S. at 135.
70. Id. at 177, 178, 240. In the wake of Myers, the United States Attorney General
was confronted with the argument that the Retirement Act constituted a legislative
usurpation of the President's power to remove postmasters. 35 Op. Arr'y GEN. 309
(1927). Observing that the question turned upon whether the Retirement Act operated
to remove officers or merely to limit their terms of office, the Attorney General con-
cluded that the Act performed the latter function, and thus was a legitimate exercise
of congressional power. Id. at 312, 314.
71. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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Humphrey declined to resign, and Roosevelt removed him. In a subse-
quent suit for lost salary, the Court defined the issues as whether the
provision in the Federal Trade Commission Act that a commissioner
could be removed for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office"72 meant to restrict the President's removal power to the causes
stated, and whether such a restriction was constitutional. In a unani-
mous decision, the Supreme Court answered both questions in the af-
firmative.7"
The legislative history of the FTCA indicates a desire to arrange
the commissioners' terms of office so that the membership of the Com-
mission will not -be subject to complete change at any time, and a desire
to make the terms long enough to give commissioners an opportunity
to acquire expertise. Congress thought it essential that the Commis-
sion be independent, and not open to suspicion of partisanship, since
its duties were "neither political nor executive, but predominantly
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. ' 74  The Court concluded:
Thus, the language of ithe act, the legislative reports, and the gen-
eral purposes of -the legislation as reflected by the debates, all com-
bine to demonstrate the Congressional intent to create a body of ex-
perts who shall gain experience by length of service-a body which
shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and
free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other
official or any department of the government. To the accomplishment of
these purposes, it is clear that Congress was of opinion that length and
certainty of tenure would vitally contribute. And to hold that, never-
theless, the members of the commission continue in office at the mere
will of the President, might be to thwart, in large measure, the very
ends which Congress sought to realize by definitely fixing the term
of office. 75
Having decided that the statute limited the power of removal to
the enumerated causes, the Court then considered the constitutional
question. It began by disapproving the sweeping dictum of Myers in-
sofar as it had gone beyond the decided point that the President could
72. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
73. As a preliminary matter, the Court distinguished Shurtleff v. United States, 189
U.S. 311 (1903), in which the Court had refused to read similar language of removabil-
ity to be exclusive, in light of the absence of any statutory term for the officer involved,
an appraiser. 295 U.S. at 621-23. The Court in Shurtleff had thought it most unlikely
that Congress intended life tenure for an executive officer in the absence of the most
explicit language to that effect. 189 U.S. at 316, 318. In Humphrey, of course, there
was a statutory term to limit the officer's tenure.
74. 295 U.S. at 624.
75. Id. at 625-26.
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remove postmasters without congressional restriction. The Court char-
acterized a postmaster as an executive officer with solely executive
functions, and no legislative or judicial ones. Myers therefore went
far enough to include "all purely executive officers, '7' but no further.
The Court characterized the FTC as divorced from the executive
branch, created by Congress to carry its legislation into effect, and de-
signed to be free from executive control. The authority of Congress
to create such agencies, the Court thought, could not be doubted.77
Limits upon the removal power were a necessary corollary since "it is
quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure
of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of inde-
pendence against the latter's will."7s
This sharp limitation of the sweeping approach of Myers was re-
affirmed in the Coures most recent treatment of the removal issue in
Wiener v. United States.79 Congress had established the War Claims
Commission to "adjudicate according to law" various claims arising
from enemy action in World War 11.80 The Commission members
were presidential appointees, and the Commission was to complete its
task within three years, thus setting the tenure of the commissioners.
There was no provision for their removal. Nevertheless, Commis-
sioner Myron Wiener was removed by President Eisenhower, who as-
serted a need to complete the Commission's task "with personnel of
my own selection."8' In another suit for lost salary, Justice Frankfurter
wrote for a unanimous Court. He was undaunted by congressional si-
lence about removal. Because of the notoriety of the Humphrey case,
he argued, Congress could not have been unaware of the problem of
the President's removal power. Congress would also have been well
aware that Humphrey drew a sharp line between officials within the
executive branch, for whom the removal power could not be restricted,
and members of a body designed to be independent, for whom the re-
moval power would exist only if Congress conferred it. "This sharp
differentiation derives from the difference in function between those
who are part of the Executive establishment and those whose tasks re-
76. Id. at 627-28.
77. The Court thought that if Congress could not limit the removal power for the
FTC, it would be hard to see any limit to the removal power except for the judiciary.
No distinction could be made even with regard to the Court of Claims, a legislative court
exercising judicial power. Id. at 629.
78. Id.
79. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
80. War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2001(d) (1970).
81. 357 U.S. at 350.
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quire absolute freedom from Executive interference."8 2 Justice Frank-
furter thus concluded that the most reliable way to detect congressional
intent regarding the removal power in this case was to examine the na-
ture of the functions that Congress had vested in the Commission. The
legislative history established that the Commission was formed as an
adjudicating body with decisions unreviewable by the executive. If
one must take it for granted that the statute precluded the President
from influencing the Commission on a particular claim, it would follow
a fortiori that Congress did not want the commissioners to fear "the
Damocles' sword of removal by the President" for no other reason than
that he preferred to have persons of his own choosing.83  Wiener's re-
moval was therefore illegal.8 4
The Supreme Court's approach in Humphrey and Wiener is very
uncompromising. One might even fault the Court for naivet6 in its
view of the agencies as impartial bodies of experts enjoying "absolute"
freedom from executive interference.8 5  Its wariness of the removal
82. Id. at 353. Presumably, Justice Frankfurter did not mean to suggest that
whether the officer is formally within the executive branch is determinative, as distin-
guished from the functions he performs. It is clear, for example, that Congress may
guarantee the independence of administrative law judges in the executive branch. 5
U.S.C. § 7521 (1970); see Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S.
128 (1953); cf. McEachem v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963).
83. 357 U.S. at 356.
84. One lower court opinion has dealt with the removal power. In Morgan v. TVA,
115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941), the court upheld the
removal of a director of the TVA. The court could not find congressional intent to
restrict the President, partially for the simple reason that the statute had been passed
between Myers and Humphrey, in a period when Congress would have had the gravest
doubts regarding its power to limit the President. The court thought that reading the
TVA statutes to deny the President power to remove TVA directors would raise a consti-
tutional question, even under Humphrey, on the possibility that a purely executive officer
was being removed. To Morgan's contention that the TVA exercised quasi-legislative
powers, destroying the President's illimitable power to remove its members, the court re-
sponded in dictum that the TVA exercised "predominantly" an executive or administra-
tive function. The President enjoyed various statutory supervisory functions; moreover,
the TVA's activities, which were for the most part managerial, were characteristic of
a part of the executive branch. The court conceded that the directors had to enact by-
laws, a legislative function, and to make decisions, which might be characterized as a
judicial function. But this was no different from the duties of any other administrative
officer. The court thought the TVA could not be compared to the regulatory commis-
sions, which it characterized as mainly exercising quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial func-
tions. The Morgan case thus illustrates the difficulty of neat separations of various posi-
tions in the Government by whether they are purely executive or not. Cf. Nader v.
Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (President's removal of Watergate Special Prose-
cutor Cox held illegal as violation of Department of Justice regulation having force of
law).
85. See 357 U.S. at 353; 295 U.S. at 625-26. See discussion at text accompanying
notes 114-33 Infra.
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power apparently stems from the view that officers having major adju-
dicative responsibilities must be independent of outside influence, and
that independence can be guaranteed only through security of tenure.
Although the Court could find specific legislative intent on this point
in Humphrey, it had no difficulty in inferring such an intent simply
from the functions assigned to the commissioners in Wiener.s"
The cases do not shed a great deal of light on what does constitute
sufficient cause for removal of a commissioner, since in the last two
major cases cause was not even asserted. Perhaps one can stake out
some limits, however. For instance, it seems clear that Humphrey not
only restricts the applicability of Myers, but also rejects its theory of
the appropriate limits upon removal of an officer having duties com-
mitted to his discretion, or engaged in adjudication. The Myers court
had argued that although a President might lack the power to overrule
an officer in a particular exercise of such functions, the President could
still remove him for his action afterwards.8 7 Humphrey's premise that
a commissioner's security of tenure is vital to commission independence
is inconsistent with any such definition of the cause sufficient for re-
moval. Pressure on a commissioner to accede to the President's wishes
is, of course, essentially the same whether removal occurs at the time
of a decision, or after a decent interval.88 This suggests that the only
grounds for removal that the Court is likely to find to be within statu-
tory contemplation are those clearly unrelated to the merits of a partic-
ular case, such as entertaining improper ex parte contacts, habitual in-
efficiency, or criminal violations. If this view of the removal power
is accurate, presidential exercise of the exemption power should trou-
ble the Court greatly. It provides an opportunity for what may be in
substance just the kind of removal suggested by Myers-for example,
refusing to exempt a commissioner who reaches mandatory retirement
age a short interval after a particular decision-and condemned by the
rationale of Humphrey and Wiener.
86. It is possible that even the members of the FCC, FPC and SEC, whose statutory
terms do not include restrictions on removal, may receive protection under Wiener.
CARY 10. Since these agencies were formed during the interim between Myers and
Humphrey, it is difficult to make any argument in favor of actual legislative intent to
restrict removal, since Congress probably would have thought that it did not have the
power. See Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701
(1941) (discussed in note 84 supra). But the Court might strain to detect such a con-
gressional intent, as a corollary to a demonstrated intent that these agencies enjoy a de-
gree of independence from executive control.
87. 272 U.S. at 135. The passage referred to is quoted in text accompanying note
69 supra.
88. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
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The Supreme Court's rationale in Humphrey and Wiener thus
raises the question whether the Court might hold that application of the
mandatory retirement statute to independent commissioners in effect
constitutes an illegal removal because of the presence of the President's
discretionary exemption power. The conclusion would be that the stat-
utes setting the terms of these officers, and not section 8335, should
govern their tenure; the process would be one of identifying and ac-
commodating the policies of the two statutes. It is appropriate to en-
gage in such a process because there is no indication of specific con-
gressional intent that section 8335 override the commissioners' statu-
tory terms.8 The mandatory retirement provision with its power of
presidential exemption took essentially its present form in 1932,90 well
before the Retirement Act was first applied to independent commis-
sioners. And neither in the abortive 1942 attempt to extend the Re-
tirement Act to the agency heads, nor in the successful 1946 reconsid-
eration, was there any attention to whether the mandatory separation
section should apply. The dominant legislative intent was to qualify the
commissioners for pensions, an objective not necessarily inconsistent
with excepting them from mandatory retirement, since their terms pro-
vide a definite terminus to their employment.
Humphrey and Wiener made very clear what the Court consid-
ered to be the major policies behind statutory terms for commissioners;
length and certainty of tenure were emphasized as vital guarantees of
commission independence. 91 Application of the mandatory retirement
and exemption provisions to the commissioners conflicts with this pol-
icy, because they grant the President discretion whether to continue
the service of a commissioner at a time short of a full term. Further-
more, the practice followed to date of granting either indefinite or rela-
tively short-term extensions exacerbates the problem.
The rationale of the removal cases also suggests that members of
independent commissions should not be subject to mandatory retire-
ment at all, regardless of the presence of the exemption power. Some
of the policies underlying statutory terms identified by the Court in
Humphrey and Wiener are plainly inconsistent with mandatory retire-
ment. For instance, substantial terms favor the accumulation of exper-
tise; mandatory retirement takes effect at a time when a commissioner's
expertise is presumably at a maximum. Also, mandatory retirement
tends to increase the number of vacancies on a commission, giving the
89. See text accompanying notes 50-66 supra.
90. See note 51 supra.
91. See 357 U.S. at 353; 295 U.S. at 626.
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President the opportunity for short-term appointments to fill the unex-
pired portions of terms, with whatever threat to independence that
poses. 92  Reducing the frequency of vacancies would also help to pre-
vent the bunching of nomination opportunities for a given President,
and would thus help to maintain the nonpartisan flavor that Congress
intended for the commissions. (Restrictions in the statutes on the num-
ber of members of one party who may be appointed 93 are, of course,
relatively little bar to a President hoping to appoint persons in philo-
sophical sympathy with him.)
Hence, the removal cases reveal strong policy reasons in favor of
reading the statutes that set the terms of commissioners to create im-
plied exceptions to the mandatory retirement statute. Still other policy
reasons have emerged in several cases involving challenges to manda-
tory retirement statutes in contexts apart from the regulatory commis-
sions.94 While a full discussion of the mandatory retirement cases is
beyond the scope of this Article, they reveal some special considera-
tions relevant to the appropriateness of subjecting independent com-
missioners to mandatory retirement.
The key argument against mandatory retirement per se is that it
arbitrarily ignores differences between persons of the same age. Over-
broad rules may be justifiable in dealing with huge numbers of employ-
ees,95 but they become less so when applied to a discrete class more
readily amenable to individualized consideration, as in the reappoint-
ment process. The arguments in favor of mandatory retirement, prin-
cipally ease of administration and easier recruitment of young employ-
ees through the lure of faster advancement, are not as persuasive in
regard to a limited number of political appointments at the commission
92. Excessive turnover on the commissions is a present problem. See Goodsell &
Gayo, Appointive Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 AD. L. REv. 291, 291-
92, 300-02 (1971) (observing that many commissioners do not serve full period of their
terms).
93. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970) (FTC); 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) (ICC).
94. See Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 940
(1975); Murgia v. Board of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974), prob. juris.
noted, 421 U.S. 974 (1975). These challenges have been based on the "irrebuttable pre-
sumption" doctrine which has developed over the past few years. The claim is that the
irrebuttable presumption established by a mandatory retirement statute constitutes a
denial of due process because the attainment of a particular age does not necessarily im-
ply that an individual is no longer capable of adequately performing his job. See gen-
erally Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7
IND. L. REv. 644 (1974); Note, The lrrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 87 HAnv. L. Ruv. 1534 (1974).
95. See Murgia v. Board of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (D. Mass. 1974),
prob. furis, noted, 421 U.S. 974 (1975).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
level. One may hesitate before establishing routine competency hear-
ings for employees reaching the age of retirement, upon a well-
grounded fear that any such proceeding might be more demeaning than
useful. But, for presidential appointees, an individualized judgment
of a person's physical condition will routinely occur anyway at the time
of reappointment. Of course, this becomes a more difficult judgment
for commissions with relatively long statutory terms.
The policy justifications for excepting independent commissioners
from mandatory retirement altogether are persuasive. Although the
legislative history of the Retirement Act does not reveal any express
legislative intent contrary to such a conclusion, it could be argued that
Congress impliedly ratified the application of the Act to commissioners
when it reenacted present section 8335 with no explicit exception for
them. But legislative attention never focused on the specific problem:
the 1956 amendments, 6 which followed the most recent presidential
exemption of an independent commissioner by over four years, 97 were
broad in scope, and the 1966 codification involved all of title 5.98 It
is inadvisable to read such a record as conclusive of the applicability
question.
III. APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN LIEu OF THE MANDATORY
RETIREMENT AND EXEMPTION PROCESS
Since the appointment process contemplates an individualized de-
termination of a person's competency to serve, it is not surprising that
the argument has been raised that the presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation of a commissioner nearing mandatory retirement
age should be treated as an implied exemption from retirement. In-
deed, perhaps an exemption should be implied whenever a commis-
sioner reaches mandatory retirement age during his statutory term, on
the premise that age was a consideration in the original appointment.
As an examination of the two cases addressing the question illustrates,
however, this is not the position that has prevailed to date.
The first case involved District of Columbia Commissioner Melvin
C. Hazen,99 who was appointed at age sixty-nine and reappointed at
age seventy-two, in neither case with a formal executive order of ex-
emption from retirement. In response to a claim by Hazen's executors
for the return of monies paid into the retirement system, the right to
96. Act of July 31, 1956, ch. 804, § 401, 70 Stat. 736.
97. Exec. Order No. 10,330, 3 C.F.R. 855 (1949-53 comp.).
98. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378.
99. 22 CoMP. GEN. 52 (1942).
[Vol. 1976:249
Vol. 1976:249] MANDATORY RETIREMENT EXEMPTION 271
which depended upon the legality of his employment, the Comptroller
General concurred with the Civil Service Commission's opinion on re-
ferral that the employment after the separation date had been legal.
The Comptroller General held that where "not long prior" to the time
of mandatory retirement and again after that date the President took
executive action to retain the officer by means of an appointment con-
firmed by the Senate, "no particular form of Executive order or action
was required. ... 100 This reading of the Act of JUne 30, 1932,101
the lineal predecessor of the current exemption statute, is strained to
say the least: the statute said that "the President may, by Executive
Order, exempt" an employee. The opinion may be seen as an under-
standable attempt to avoid the harsh consequence of penalizing the es-
tate of an employee who was not responsible for the failure to produce
a formal executive order, but it is a most unsatisfactory precedent. The
operative language is hopelessly vague-no one can be sure when a
reappointment has been "not long prior" to the age of separation.
It is therefore not surprising that a correction was attempted in
the next case to arise, that of ICC Commissioner William J. Patter-
son.1"2 Commissioner Patterson turned seventy in June, 1950, and or-
dinarily would have been retired at the end of that month. He had
been appointed in 1945 for a term to expire at the end of 1952; thus
the case presented the issue of whether every reappointment should
be viewed as an implied executive order of exemption for the period
of the term. In Commissioner Patterson's case, the Chairman of the
ICC had requested an executive order exempting him for the re-
mainder of his term, but by the retirement date none had appeared.103
After that date, however, Commissioner Patterson simply kept work-
ing, contending that he could stay until the expiration of his term.1'0
Commissioner Patterson was claiming under the Hazen case,'0 5 or pre-
sumably under the removal cases. 0 6 In July, the ICC asked the
Comptroller General whether it could continue to pay the Commis-
sioner.
100. Id. at 54.
101. Ch. 314, § 204, 47 Stat. 404 (quoted in pertinent part in note 51 supra).
102. 30 Comp. GEN. 51 (1950).
103. Id. at 52.
104. Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1950, at 10, cal. 7.
105. In Commissioner Patterson's letter to the Comptroller General he cited the
Hazen decision in support of his claim. 30 CoMp. GEN. at 52.
106. The removal cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 67-98 supra.
The argument under the removal cases would have been that the mandatory separation
provisions of the Retirement Act were not meant to apply to independent commissioners,
leaving the statutet setting their terms to govern.
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The Comptroller General's opinion observed that the Civil Service
Commission administers the Retirement Act; therefore the question
whether an employee has reached a retirement status "primarily is a
matter for consideration by the Civil Service Commission.' 10 7  The
Comptroller General pointed out that he had concurred with the Com-
mission in Hazen because the first relevant appointment had been eight
months prior to the retirement age and there had been a reappointment
after age seventy. But in Patterson's case the reappointment was about
five and a half years prior to separation, and no presidential action had
occurred subsequent to the Commissioner's attaining the age of sev-
enty. The Comptroller General suggested that the matter be submit-
ted to the Civil Service Commission for a determination of Commis-
sioner Patterson's status, but gave the pointed hint that "under the ex-
isting facts there appears to be no proper basis for certifying. . . com-
pensation. . . . Two days later, the controversy was defused by
the issuance of an executive order exempting the Commissioner for an
indefinite period not to exceed his term of office.'09
The opinions in Hazen and Patterson are fundamentally unsatis-
factory. Read together, they suggest that a presidential appointment
"not long prior" to the separation date, or occurring after it, constitutes
an exemption that need not be ratified by executive order, but that not
every appointment of a commissioner who will reach age seventy dur-
ing his term qualifies. Even assuming that the statutes fixing the terms
of commissioners should not be read as implied exemptions to the
mandatory retirement statute, several other difficulties remain. First,
one cannot predict at what point along the continuum between the
two cases a person is reappointed "not long prior" to separation. Sec-
ond, it is doubtful that the age of an individual is under contemplation
by the President and the Senate when the commissioner is within per-
haps a year of retirement, but not when the person will reach age sev-
enty later in the term. Perhaps appointments of persons already over
retirement age necessarily constitute implied retirement exemptions,
however. Third, both cases seem to presuppose that the specific term
"by Executive Order" in the exemption statute can be read to mean
something other than what it says. Any such gloss seems impermis-
sible in terms of the ordinarily exclusive meaning of "Executive Or-
107. 30 CoMP. GEN. at 53.
108. Id.
109. Exec. Order No. 10,146, 3 C.F.R. 325 (1949-53 camp.). The exemption may
have been illegal. It occurred after the retirement date and purported to be retroactive,
despite an earlier Attorney General's opinion, see note 31 supra, that there was no au-
thority to exempt once the retirement date had passed.
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der," the otherwise consistent position of the Civil Service Commission
that an executive order is required for exemption, 110 and the consistent
presidential practice of issuing executive orders, a practice broken only
by the apparently inadvertent omission in Commissioner Hazen's case.
In three separate instances, President Truman reappointed a commis-
sioner already under exemption, but he issued an executive order of
exemption, not relying upon the reappointment and confirmation as
sufficient."' Similarly, FTC Commissioner Macntyre, who was last
reappointed in 1968 within three years of the retirement age by Presi-
dent Johnson," 2 was later granted three separate extensions by Presi-
dent Nixon, who also chose not to rely upon reappointment alone."13
In sum, it does not seem wise to approach the problems of reconciling
statutory policy inherent in the retirement exemption question through
an analysis focusing on a case-by-case search for the implied intent of
the President and the Senate at the time of appointment.
IV. EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF THE REGULATORY AGENCIES
Since the principal question regarding the appropriateness of the
President's exemption power under section 8335 is whether it fosters
undue presidential control of the independent agencies, it is important
to place that power in the context of the commonly understood bounda-
ries of executive control. There are at least three major types of pos-
sible control." 4
The first is the power to appoint and to remove commissioners.
Clearly, appointments can strongly influence an agency's direction and
vigor. Equally clearly, the President has a legitimate interest in re-
viewing commissioners' performance in office for reappointment pur-
poses. Removal, however, has not proved a useful means of executive
control of the agencies, if the absence of its exercise be any guide. Sub-
stantial doubts concerning what constitutes sufficient cause for removal
probably deter frequent presidential use of the power. And removal
110. File, Bureau of Retirement, Insurance, and Occupational Health, United States
Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C.
111. Exec. Order No. 9963, 3 C.F.R. 706 (1943-48 comp.); Exec. Order No. 10,034,
3 C.F.R. 227-28 (1949-53 comp.); Exec. Order No. 10,255, 3 C.F.R. 760 (1949-53
comp.).
112. Interview with A.E. MacIntyre, former Commissioner, FTC, in Washington,
D.C., July 22, 1975.
113. Commissioner Macntyre reports that the White House position was that the
mandatory retirement statute applied to him, and that an executive order would be
needed. Id. See Table 1 in the Appendix for the exemption sequence.
114. Dixon (comprehensive review of these controls and others).
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is a politically hazardous step, especially if a commissioner has support
in Congress. 15
The second major means of executive control of the agencies is
through the power of the Office of Management and Budget to control
the budget and spending of the agencies and their requests for legisla-
tion. 1 ' The President also has the power to name the chairmen of
the major independent commissions. 117  The chairmen, in turn, have
important powers over agency personnel and spending."1 '
A third major method of executive control of the agencies is presi-
dential direction of agency action. This method presents the subtlest
issues of separation of powers, and most Presidents have not been
quick to exercise it. There seems to be general agreement that the
President has a legitimate role in reviewing the efficiency of the agen-
cies, pursuant to his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faith-
fully executed." 9  That is, the President should be interested in the
presence of undue agency delay in the dispatch of its business, and in
whether the agency is engaged in setting policy pursuant to its man-
date. The President's powers to revivify an agency include removing
its commissioners for inefficiency, changing its chairman, and changing
its budgetary and legislative requests to Congress.
The debate currently centers on whether the President should go
beyond considerations of agency efficiency to policy guidance, and if
he should direct the agencies on policy, whether he should do so only
in a general or in a specific fashion.1 20 One should note at the outset
that it may be difficult as a practical matter to separate questions of
efficiency from those of substantive policy, especially when an agency
demonstrates indecision in the face of thorny problems. Advocates of
increased executive control have emphasized a need to coordinate pol-
icy where the responsibilities of independent agencies overlap with one
115. Cf. CAY 10. It may be, however, that if a President removed a commissioner
for asserted malfeasance, the Supreme Court would regard the issue as an unreviewable
political question. See Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regula-
tory Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 163 (1939); Rogers, The Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 52 POL. SCL Q. 1, 7-8 (1937).
116. CARY 6-8, 11-12; Dixon 6-8; MacIntyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence,
29 FED. B.J. 1, 5-6 (1968).
117. Dixon 8.
118. Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrktive Action, 57 CALru. L. REv. 896,
898-99 & n.161 (1969).
119. CARY 21; FRIENDLY 148-49; 1. LANDIs, RPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO
Tim PRESmENT-ELECr 32-33 (1960).
120. Compare FRmNDLY 152-58 with CARY 20; Dixon 12-13, and Redford, The Presi-
dent and the Regulatory Commissions, 44 Txs L REv. 288 (1965).
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another and with the executive departments. 21 Enthusiasm for
change should be tempered, however, with recognition that problems
of coordination are not unknown within and among the executive de-
partments already subject to full presidential control. 122 Since Presi-
dents have little difficulty in making their policy views known, and
since consensual policy coordination among the independent agencies
can occur at present, the real problem is agency refusal to cooperate.
The Administration can formally intervene in agency proceedings, 123
and if the agency does not concur, its reasons can be articulated. This
sets the stage for Congress to resolve the dispute through legislation
(or more subtle means such as appropriations) if it chooses. The
question, then, is whether to shift the policy initiative from the agencies
that presently possess it to the President.
Arguments against increased executive control emphasize that
policy guidance may not be significantly restrictive of agency discretion
in application if it is at a broad level of generality, such as the need
to reduce inflation or to increase competition, 24 and below this level
of platitude there may not exist a well-articulated national policy that
can be stated to the agencies and followed by them. 125  The net effect
of executive control may therefore be simply to shift decisions from
the agencies created to handle them into the White House. 2 6 Deci-
sions there might be invisible to the public, and infected with consider-
ations of partisan politics. 127 They would lack the contributions of the
experienced agency staff and the benefits of full party participation as
well. 1
28
Those who would have the White House oversee both efficiency
and the basic course of agency policy generally concede that it is im-
proper for the White House to interfere in pending adjudications. 2
This poses a difficulty with capacity to give guidance in a meaningful
121. See, e.g., I. LANDIS, supra note 119, at 24-33; Dixon 12-13; Redford, supra note
120, at 308-12.
122. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AumINTRTrvE ACTION 23 & n.33 (1965).
123. FRIENDLY 152; Dixon 9.
124. FRIENDLY 150.
125. CARY 22, 136.
126. CARY 21. The most radical suggestions for coordinating agency policymaking
tend to resemble the famous Hector-Minow proposals that the adjudicative function of
agencies be removed and placed in a single administrative court, so that a super agency
could coordinate policy. CARY 125-27. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMiNSTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 1.04-4 (Supp. 1970). These proposals give short shrift to the fact that all
agency functions make policy and act in an interdependent fashion.
127. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 126, at § 1.04-4.
128. Id. § 1.03, at 23 n.19.
129. FRIENDLY 150-51.
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fashion, given the propensity of agencies to set policy through adjudica-
tion. One might refine the limitation to allow guidance on legislative
issues,130 even those present in pending adjudications-for instance, a
directive that competition be favored in licensing decisions.1"1 It
would remain improper to influence adjudicative issues, such as whether
a certain license should issue to a petitioner. When agencies are form-
ing policy through a few major adjudications, this may, however, be
a distinction with little practical difference.
If agencies are left to decide only specific issues and not broad
policy, their expertise is largely wasted. Also, the blurring of responsi-
bility for a given policy decision is unlikely to aid government effici-
ency. 132 It is even harder to justify thoroughgoing White House con-
trol in terms of the basic purpose behind the formation of independent
agencies. For these agencies must be regarded as very much the
agents of Congress, exercising delegations of power that were pur-
posely given to a separate agency and not to the executive branch.183
Although the general reasons for the creation of independent agencies
are well known, it seems unlikely that legislation governing a particu-
lar agency will reveal much to guide those trying to decide how much
executive control is permissible. One could ask whether a given func-
tion is one meant to be exercised independently, but legislative dele-
gations of power are customarily too vague to be enlightening in this
regard. Perhaps the vagueness of the limits to presidential propriety
in directing independent agency policymaking helps to explain the ab-
sence of a tradition of presidential aggressiveness in asserting such a
power. Yet a statute clearly conferring a power of direction seems un-
wise, since it is unlikely that the difficulties the agencies have in setting
policy would be cured by shifting those functions partially into the
White House.
V. CONCLUSION
The independent agencies exist in a state of tension between
President and Congress.' 4 Ambiguities in their status probably cause
practical accommodations of power, but can mask arbitrary or ineffici-
ent conduct of government. The President's power to exempt inde-
130. See generally K. DAviS, AiDmngmTSrm LAw TEXT § 7.03 (1972) (distin.
guishes between adjudicative and legislative issues).
131. Cf. Redford, supra note 120, at 306.
132. See FRIENDLY 153.
133. CAY 20, 135-36; FRIENDLY 153-56.
134. See CARY 4.
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pendent commissioners from mandatory retirement is perhaps not the
weightiest hawser upon which Congress and President can haul, but
there is needless uncertainty in the present situation.
The preferable resolution of the issue would be to except the in-
dependent commissioners from mandatory retirement, either by statu-
tory interpretation or by explicit amendment to section 8335. Argu-
ably, the statutes setting the terms of independent commissioners
should be read as implied exceptions to the mandatory separation and
discretionary exemption provisions of the Retirement Act. But in
the absence of any definitive judicial statement on the question, Con-
gress should amend section 8335 to exclude members of major inde-
pendent agencies from its coverage. This recommendation rests on a
judgment that institutional considerations underlying the statutory
terms of these officers have overriding significance compared to the
flexibility afforded by the current exemption practice. Also, the major
policies behind mandatory retirement and presidential exemption can
be achieved in satisfactory measure in the reappointment process.
An alternative recommendation, less desirable because it contains
some potential intrusion upon commission independence, is that a stat-
utory amendment restrict the presidential exemption power. Such an
amendment could require that exemptions under section 8335(c) be
for the remainder of a commissioner's term, or that they be for a set
period not subject to renewal. Either recommendation is preferable
to an amendment removing the exemption power over the commission-
ers and subjecting them to mandatory retirement, because the policies
favoring mandatory retirement for most government employees have
diminished force when applied to the commissioners. In any event,
it is important that Congress resolve the question whether the manda-
tory retirement statute should be read to apply to the commissioners
at all. Currently prevailing assumptions that the exemption practice
is valid in this application seem to stem more from the absence of court
challenge than from any demonstration of clarity in relevant congres-
sional purpose.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
EXEMPTIONS OF MEMBM; OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS AND THE
TAx COURT,* 1946 TO DATE
President Exec.
and Year Order No.
HST
1946 9780
1947 9895
1948 9954
9956
9963
9966
9983
10,021
1949 10,034
10,073
10,094
1950 10,146
10,198
1951 10,255
10,315
1952 10,330
RMN
1970 11,568
1972 11,642
1973 11,704
11,756
1974 11,791
GRF
Name
C.B. Aitchison
W.A. Ayres
E.L. Davis
C.L. Draper
S.B. Hill
L.A. Johnson
W.W. Arnold
J.A. Tyson
J.M. Johnson
H.B. Mitchell
S.B. Hill
C. Miller
G.S. Ferguson
H.B. Mitchell
J.M. Johnson
E. Black
C.B. Aitchison
WJ. Patterson
PA. Walker
C.L. Draper
W.E. Lee
F. Perkins
A.E. MacIntyre
A.B. MacIntyre
A.E. MacIntyre
W. Gillfland
K.H. Tuggle
11,824 W. Gillilland
11,826 W. Deason
Exec. Order
No. of Prior
Agency Exemption
ICC
FTCFTC
FPC
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
ICC
CSC
Tax Court
ICC
FTCCSC
ICC
Tax Court
ICC
ICC
FCC
FPC
ICC
CSC
FTC
FTC
FTC
CAB
ICC
Period of Exemption
Indefinite to term**
Indefinite to term
Vp
- Indefinite to term
- Seven months
9780 Indefinite to new
term
Indefinite to term
- Indefinite to term
9956 Indefinite
9954 Indefinite to new
term
- Indefinite to term
9780 To qualification of
successor
- Indefinite to term***
- Indefinite to term
9780 New term (five years)
- Indefinite to term
- Indefinite
11,568
11,568,
11,642
One year
One year
One year
Eleven months
Eighteen months
CAB 11,756 Six months
ICC - Eleven months
* This list includes members of the major regulatory agencies (ICC, FTC, FPC,
SEC, CAB, FCC, NLRB), the Civil Service Commission, and the Tax Court. The
titles of other exempted employees appear in Table 2. See note 7 supra.
** Exemptions with this designation in the Table were phrased in substance as
follows: "for an indefinite period of time not extending beyond the expiration of his
present term of office ... ." A variation, adding a proviso that "for the purposes of
this order, his present term of office shall be considered as expiring upon the appoint-
ment and qualification of his successor," is found in Exec. Orders Nos. 9954, 9983,
10,034, 10,146, and 10,315. The statutes setting the terms of the FTC and ICC com-
missioners involved provide for their continued service until a successor has been ap-
pointed and has qualified, to prevent vacancies. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970), 49 U.S.C.
§ 11 (1970).
*** Executive Order dated August 2, 1950, and made retroactive to July 1, 1950.
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TABLE 2
OTmn EmpLoyms Exmq.m By ExEctrnv ORDna, 1946 To DAT
President
HST
DDE
JFK
LBJ
RMN
GRF
Exec. Order No.
9780
9973
10,002
10,215
10,225
10,229
10,239
10,273
10,320
10,333
10,334
10,364
10,569
11,024
11,154
11,378
11,619
11,653
11,657
11,675
11,757
11,847
11,869
11,909
Title of Employee
Commissioner, U.S. Tariff Commission
Director, FDIC
Member, National Mediation Board
Executive Secretary, Panama Canal
Commissioner, International Boundary
& Water Commission
Comptroller of Customs
Collector of Customs
USDA employee
Collector of Customs
Director, Export-Import Bank
Commissioner, International Boundary
& Water Commission
Collector of Customs
Organist and Choirmaster, U.S.
Military Academy
Public Printer
Organist and Choirmaster, U.S.
Military Academy
Director, National Science Foundation
Director, FBI
Postmaster
Secretary to Former President Truman
U.S. Marshal
Member, Federal Farm Credit Board
Member, Subversive Activities Control
Board
Librarian of Congress
Vice President, Export-Import Bank
Chairman, Commission on Civil Rights
Vice President, Export-Import Bank

